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We present a security analysis against collective attacks for the recently proposed time-energy
entanglement-based quantum key distribution protocol, given the practical constraints of single
photon detector efficiency, channel loss, and finite-key considerations. We find a positive secure-key
capacity when the key length increases beyond 104 for eight-dimensional systems. The minimum
key length required is reduced by the ability to post-select on coincident single-photon detection
events. Including finite-key effects, we show the ability to establish a shared secret key over a 200
km fiber link.
I. INTRODUCTION
High-dimensional quantum key distribution (QKD) [1]
allows two parties, Alice and Bob, to establish a secret
key at a potentially higher rate than that afforded by two-
level QKD protocols [2, 3]. When the photonic states
span a high-dimensional Hilbert space, more than one
bit of secure information can be shared per single pho-
ton detected. Additionally, increasing the dimension of a
QKD protocol can improve resilience to noise [4]. High-
dimensional QKD protocols have been implemented by
encoding information in various photonic degrees of free-
dom, including position-momentum [5], time [6–11], and
orbital angular momentum [12–15].
Here, we consider the recently proposed dispersive-
optics QKD protocol (DO-QKD), which employs energy-
time entanglement of pairs of photons. We recently
proved security against collective attacks for this protocol
in the limit of infinite key length [11]. In DO-QKD, the
photon pairs are generated by a spontaneous paramet-
ric downconversion (SPDC) source held by Alice. The
largest possible dimension d of the protocol is given by
the Schmidt number, i.e., the number of possible infor-
mation eigenstates in the system. This is approximately
d ≡ σcoh/σcor [8, 16], where σcoh is the coherence time of
the SPDC pump field, and σcor is the correlation time be-
tween photons, which is set by the phase-matching band-
width of the SPDC source. Alice keeps one photon and
sends the other to Bob, and shared information is gener-
ated from the correlated photon arrival times measured
on single photon detectors by Alice and Bob. Figure 1a
presents a schematic of the setup.
In DO-QKD, conjugate measurement bases are imple-
mented using group velocity dispersion (GVD). If Alice
applies normal dispersion and Bob applies anomalous dis-
persion, the original correlations between their photons
can be recovered [17]. However, if only one party applies
dispersion and the other does not, the timing correlations
are lost or severely diminished, depending on the magni-
FIG. 1. a) Schematic of the DO-QKD setup. Alice holds
the SPDC source, keeps one photon, and sends the other to
Bob. In case 1, Alice measures in the dispersed arrival-time
basis, and in case 2, she measures in the arrival-time basis.
Bob must measure in the same basis as Alice for their mea-
surements to be correlated. QC is quantum communication,
CC is classical communication, ND is normal dispersion, and
AD is anomalous dispersion. b) Depiction of decreased pho-
ton correlations measured by Alice and Bob, from the ideal
correlation time σcor to the observed σ
′
cor.
tude of the dispersion applied. Alice and Bob randomly
choose to apply—or not apply—dispersion to their pho-
tons before measuring their arrival times. Measurements
made without dispersion are referred to as being in the
arrival-time basis and measurements made with disper-
sion are in the dispersed arrival-time basis. After the
measurement stage of the protocol, Alice and Bob com-
municate their basis choices and keep only the data from
time frames in which they each registered a single de-
tection event while using the same basis. They publicly
compare a subset of their raw keys to bound an eaves-
dropper’s shared information. Then they use error cor-
rection and privacy amplification [18] to extract identical
secret keys.
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2The security analysis of DO-QKD relies on estimating
the covariance matrix of Alice’s and Bob’s measurements.
Specifically, Alice and Bob use their publicly compared
raw key to estimate the increase in the correlation time
of their photons from σcor to σ
′
cor, the experimentally
observed correlation time (see Figure 1b). The precision
of Alice and Bob’s estimation of σ′cor increases with the
sample size; however, publicly comparing a greater frac-
tion of their measurements reduces the amount of raw key
that can be used to generate the secret key. In practice,
Alice and Bob have a finite number of measurements,
so they must find the optimal compromise between the
conflicting goals of accurately estimating parameters and
maximizing the length of their secret key.
Alice and Bob’s finite number of measurements also
requires a generalization of our previous security proof
for DO-QKD [11], which relied on the asymptotic limit:
Alice and Bob’s keys and the data subset used for param-
eter estimation were assumed to be infinitely long. Here,
we extend our previous security analysis to show that
DO-QKD is secure against collective attacks, given the
practical constraints of single-photon detector efficiency,
channel loss, and finite-key considerations [19–27].
II. FINITE-KEY ANALYSIS FOR ARBITRARY
BASIS SELECTION PROBABILITIES
A. Asymmetric basis selection
In the standard QKD protocols [2, 3, 28], Alice and
Bob selected between the two measurement bases with
equal probabilities, limiting the probability of generating
a shared character of key to at most 50%. It was later
suggested [29] that the efficiency of a QKD protocol could
be increased asymptotically to 100% if Alice and Bob
choose one measurement basis with a greater probability
than the other, which increases the likelihood that Alice
and Bob will make measurements in the same basis. We
will take the same approach here.
Without further modification to our protocol, Eve
could exploit Alice and Bob’s asymmetric selection. If
Eve were aware of Alice and Bob’s basis choice probabil-
ities, then by using only the dominant basis, she could
eavesdrop while introducing fewer timing errors in the
conjugate basis, i.e., a smaller observed increase in the
correlation time. If Eve chooses to eavesdrop in the
arrival-time basis, she would introduce more errors in
the dispersed-arrival-time basis. This gives Eve a better
chance of remaining undetected by Alice and Bob. To
prevent this possibility, Alice and Bob must further mod-
ify their protocol: they divide their data according to the
measurement basis used, and they estimate parameters,
such as the correlation time, separately for each basis.
When implementing DO-QKD using asymmetric ba-
sis selection, we assume that Alice and Bob choose to
measure in the arrival-time basis (in which photons are
measured directly without dispersion) with probability
p > 1/2; that is, Alice and Bob apply GVD to fewer
than half of the signal photons. The exact value of p
must then be chosen, along with other parameters, to
optimize the secure-key capacity for a given finite num-
ber of measurements, as described below.
B. Finite-key effects on secure-key capacity
Outside the asymptotic limit,a protocol can be only
εs-secure, where εs is the tolerated failure probability of
the entire protocol [19]. The entire protocol is said to fail
if, at its conclusion, unbeknownst to Alice and Bob, the
eavesdropper holds information about their secret key.
The security parameter εs is the sum of the failure prob-
abilities of each stage of the protocol:
εs = εEC + εPA + εPE + ε¯, (1)
where εEC/PA/PE are the probabilities that error cor-
rection, privacy amplification, or parameter estimation,
respectively, fail [23]. Error correction fails if Alice and
Bob are unable to obtain identical keys. Privacy ampli-
fication fails if it leaks information to the eavesdropper.
Parameter estimation fails if the real parameter lies out-
side of the confidence interval set by εPE . The ε¯ term in
(1) accounts for the accuracy of estimating the smooth
min-entropy, which characterizes the amount of secure
information that can be extracted using privacy amplifi-
cation [19]. Failure of any stage of the protocol implies
that Alice and Bob are unaware that something has gone
wrong [24].
The finite-key secure-key capacity for the DO-QKD
protocol can then be written as [19–24]:
rN =
n
N
(
rDO − 1
n
log2
2
εEC
− 2
n
log2
1
εPA
−(2 log2 d+ 3)
√
log2(2/ε¯)
n
)
.
(2)
Here rDO is the secure-key capacity in the asymptotic
regime, which was derived in Ref. [11]. The units in
(2) are bits per coincidence (bpc), i.e., bits per frame in
which Alice and Bob each detect only one event. N is
the number of instances in which Alice and Bob both
detect a single photon in a measurement frame. The
parameter n = p2N denotes the number of frames in
which Alice and Bob both chose the arrival-time basis,
where p is the probability that the arrival-time basis is
chosen. We assume that Alice and Bob use the same
value of p. The subtracted terms on the right-hand side
of Eq. (2) represent the corrections to rDO due to the
finite key length.
The factor n/N in (2) reflects the fact that not all of
the coincidences detected by Alice and Bob contribute to
key generation because some coincidences must be sacri-
ficed for parameter estimation. In particular, we assume
that all m = (1 − p)2N coincidences in the dispersed
3arrival-time basis are used for parameter estimation. Al-
ice and Bob also sacrifice m of the coincidences in the
arrival-time basis to estimate parameters for that basis,
leaving n − m coincidences in the arrival-time basis for
key generation.
For each value of N , we maximize rN by optimizing
the parameter set {εPA, εPE , ε¯, p}; thus the basis choice
probability p is a function of N , the number of signals
exchanged. The security parameter εs is determined be-
forehand by Alice and Bob’s security requirements, and
εEC is fixed by the choice of error correction code. Ad-
ditionally, the calculation of rDO must be modified to
include the effects of finite key length on parameter esti-
mation.
C. Modified asymptotic secure-key capacity and
parameter estimation
The asymptotic secure-key capacity rDO is given by
[11]:
rDO = βI(A;B)− χ(A;E), (3)
where β is the reconciliation efficiency, I(A;B) is Alice
and Bob’s Shannon information, and χ(A;E) is Alice and
Eve’s Holevo information. Since Alice and Bob use only
measurements made in the arrival-time basis for the key,
their Shannon information is calculated using only the
contribution from the arrival-time basis. This calculation
includes the effects of detection efficiency, timing jitter,
and dark counts. To calculate the Holevo information,
Alice and Bob must determine the covariance matrix of
their data. To do this, they must estimate the increase
in their photons’ correlation time from σcor to σ
′
cor, as
depicted in Figure 1b.
The covariance matrix Γ is given by
Γ =
(
γAA (1− η)γAB
(1− η)γBA (1 + )γBB
)
, (4)
where Γ is a four-by-four matrix composed of four two-by-
two submatrices. Each submatrix γJK for J,K = A,B
describes the covariance between the measurements of
parties J and K. The submatrices are given by
γAA =
( u+v
16 −u+v8k
−u+v8k (u+v)(4k
2+uv)
4k2uv
)
,
γAB = γ
T
BA =
( u−v
16
u−v
8k
−u−v8k − (u−v)(4k
2+uv)
4k2uv
)
,
γBB =
(u+v
16
u+v
8k
u+v
8k
(u+v)(4k2+uv)
4k2uv
)
,
where u = 16σ2coh and v = 4σ
2
cor [11]. In Γ, η repre-
sents the decrease in correlations, and  represents the
excess noise. These two parameters quantify the effects
of an eavesdropper, channel noise, and setup imperfec-
tions. Without loss of generality, we assume that η and
 are the same for both bases.
Alice and Bob can obtain values for η and  using
their estimate for σ′cor. We define the parameter ξ,
which quantifies the increase in the correlation time:
σ′2cor = (1 + ξ)σ
2
cor. Then, the relationship between η,
, and ξ is given by
 =
−2η(d2 − 14 ) + ξ
d2 + 14
. (5)
Alice and Bob estimate ξ from their data and choose
values of η and  that maximize the Holevo information
(thereby minimizing rDO) and satisfy Eq. (5) and the
following conditions [11]: (i) Eve cannot increase Alice
and Bob’s Shannon information by interacting with only
Bob’s photons due to the data processing inequality; (ii)
the symplectic eigenvalues of the covariance matrix are
greater than 12 such that the Heisenberg uncertainty re-
lation is satisfied; (iii) Eve can only degrade (and not
improve) Alice and Bob’s measured arrival-time correla-
tion.
Alice and Bob sample only part of their data to es-
timate σ′cor. In the finite-key regime, it is important
to know how well their estimate represents the entire
dataset. Because Alice and Bob’s arrival times, TA and
TB , in a post-selected frame are jointly-Gaussian ran-
dom variables, and the sequence of these measurements
are statistically independent, their estimate for σ′cor, de-
noted σˆ′cor, has a χ
2 distribution:
(m− 1) σˆ
′2
cor
σ2cor
∼ χ2(1− εPE ,m− 1). (6)
An upper bound on σ′cor is then given by [24]:
(σ′cor,max)
2 = σ2cor +
2√
m
erf−1(1− εPE)σˆ′2cor. (7)
This bound is valid for the confidence interval 1 − εPE .
Then, the largest possible estimate for ξ within the con-
fidence interval is
ξmax =
(σ′cor,max)
2
σ2cor
− 1. (8)
Now, Alice and Bob can use their estimate for ξmax to
calculate the most pessimistic secure-key capacity.
III. NUMERICAL RESULTS
Figure 2 plots the secure-key capacity for DO-QKD
in the finite-key regime in bits per coincidence. Fig-
ure 2 assumes asymmetric basis selection, zero trans-
mission loss, estimated correlation time σˆ′cor = 1.1σcor,
security parameter εs = 10
−5, and error correction code
failure probability εEC = 10
−10 [19, 20]. The reconcilia-
tion efficiency is β = 0.9, which is possible using multi-
level reverse reconciliation with low-density parity-check
(LDPC) codes [30]. It was found that the secure-key ca-
pacity is not strongly altered by the choice of εs [19, 24].
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FIG. 2. (Color online) Plot of DO-QKD finite-key secure-
key capacities in bpc (bits per frame in which Alice and Bob
each detect only one event) assuming Alice and Bob observe
σˆ′cor = 1.1σcor and detector jitter = 2σcor/3, where σcor is
the correlation time. The security parameter is εs = 10
−5,
the failure probability of the error correction is εEC = 10
−10,
and the reconciliation efficiency is β = 0.9. Alice’s and Bob’s
system detection efficiencies are 93% [31], and the dark count
rate is 1000 s−1. All other parameters were chosen to match
[11]. From top to bottom: d = 64, d = 32, d = 16, d = 8.
Likewise, for d = 8 we calculated max(rN ) = 1.94 for all
security parameters between 10−4 and 10−7, and found
similar results for other d.
An important figure of merit is the smallest N at which
Alice and Bob can obtain a useful amount of secure infor-
mation. Figure 2 shows that this occurs around N ≈ 104,
for the chosen parameter values. The inability to obtain
secure key at lower N values is due to the finite key length
and its effect on Alice and Bob’s parameter estimation.
As N gets smaller, Alice and Bob must sacrifice a larger
fraction of their measurements to estimate ξ to the de-
sired accuracy. If N is too small, Alice and Bob have
too few measurements left to use for key generation after
sacrificing the required number for parameter estimation.
The probability of choosing the arrival-time basis, p,
directly determines the number of measurements sacri-
ficed, m = (1 − p)2N . For each value of N , the value of
p is determined numerically to maximize the secure-key
capacity. Figure 3 plots the arrival-time basis selection
probability p, the secure-key capacity using asymmetric
basis selection, and the secure-key capacity using sym-
metric basis selection as functions of N for d = 8. Asym-
metric basis selection clearly boosts the amount of secure
information per coincidence, with p approaching 1 as the
asymmetric secure-key capacity approaches its asymp-
totic value. In the symmetric case, where p = 1/2, Alice
and Bob have on average only N/2 coincidences that were
measured in the same basis: Around N/4 coincidences
were measured in the arrival-time basis, and N/4 in
the dispersed arrival-time basis. We continue to assume
that the measurements made in the dispersed arrival-
time basis are used for parameter estimation, leaving only
around n = N/4 measurements made in the arrival-time
basis for the key. With this assumption, the maximum
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FIG. 3. (Color online) Comparison of p = probability of
choosing the arrival-time basis (solid line, left), the secure-key
capacity in bpc assuming asymmetric basis selection (dashed
line, right), and the secure-key capacity in bpc assuming sym-
metric basis selection (dash-dotted line, right) for d = 8.
For all N , the secure-key capacity is maximized by choos-
ing p > 1/2. With symmetric basis selection (p = 1/2), the
secure-key capacity is limited to 25% of the asymptotic value.
possible secure-key capacity, even for large N , reaches
only 25% of the asymptotic value. For all N that yield
a positive amount of secure key, it is optimal to choose
p > 1/2. However, while the asymmetric basis selection
increases the secure-key capacity for all N that yield a
positive amount of secure key, we see numerically that
it does not change the minimum N required to obtain a
positive amount of secure key.
Discrete-variable QKD protocols are generally able to
extract a useful amount of secure information at N ≈ 105
[19, 20, 22, 32]. Continuous-variable QKD (CV-QKD)
protocols require more measurements; for realistic pa-
rameter values, secure information is not obtained until
N ≈ 108 [24, 33]. Although time is a continuous variable,
DO-QKD performs more like a discrete-variable proto-
col when considering the minimum N required to obtain
secure key: some secure key can be obtained even at
N ≈ 104.
We also see that even including finite-key effects, DO-
QKD can reach a transmission distance > 200 km. This
is longer than the maximum distance reached by CV-
QKD protocols, which have so far seen transmission up
to 80 km [33]. Figure 4 plots the asymmetric secure-key
capacity as a function of channel length for dimension
d = 8 and various values of N .
IV. CONCLUSION
We have shown security against collective attacks for a
high-dimensional QKD protocol in the finite-key regime.
The protocol considered, DO-QKD, is robust to noise
and can provide transmission of secure information at
distances > 200 km of fiber. Working in the finite-key
regime does not significantly affect the previously calcu-
lated secure-key capacity [11]: for experimentally achiev-
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FIG. 4. (Color online) Finite-key secure-key capacities in bpc
versus channel length (loss) for different numbers of coinci-
dences, N . d = 8 for all; transmission loss 0.2 dB/km; other
parameters same as Figure 2 and [11]. From top to bottom:
N =∞, N = 1012, N = 1010, N = 108, N = 106, N = 104.
able parameters, Alice and Bob can reach > 90% of the
asymptotic secure-key capacity for a reasonable number
of coincidences, N ≈ 108, and a positive amount of se-
cure key can be extracted after detection of as few as
N ≈ 104 coincidences.
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